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might well feel that a particular defendant's potential for rehabilitation is good and that an extended prison term would be detrimental
to that promise. Under the rule of the Lewis case, however, the
trial judge is faced with a choice between black or white and has no
authority to consider the shades in between.
It is submitted that accordance of authority to trial judges to
utilize the split sentence would effectively fill the void between the
existing extremes of suspension in entirety or complete active imposition of the sentence. Presumably this could be legislatively accomplished by amending G.S. § 15-197 to provide express authorization for partial suspension."2 Such action would allow the judge
to treat the defendant more as an individual and to adapt the
sentence to the offender rather than to the offense. It would effect
recognition of "the differences in men which justify differences in
treatment and the differences in treatment which will achieve the
''83
ends at which we aim.

FRANK W.

BULLOCK, JR.

Domestic Relations-Abandonment-Divorce Granted to an
Abandoning Husband After the Wife's Action for Support

By statute in North Carolina,' a husband or wife, having lived
separate and apart from the other for two years, may obtain an
absolute divorce, provided the residence requirement is satisfied.
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that notwithstanding this statute if the husband has abandoned his wife, she
may set up the abandonment as a bar to his action for divorce.'
problem might be to provide for separation of defendants serving short split
sentences such as is now provided for youthful offenders. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-212 (Supp. 1959).
"2Should the North Carolina court adhere to the same reasoning as in the
Lewis case, however, they might regard this as an infringement on the
power of the parole board, and thus hold the provision of the statute to be
of no effect.

"' Coates, supra note 30, at 230.
'N.C. GENr. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).

'Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943). In this case the
court stated: "It is true, the statute under review provides that either party
may sue for a divorce or for a dissolution of the bonds of matrimony, 'if and
when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for two years'....
However, it is not to be supposed the General Assembly intended to authorize one spouse willfully or wrongfully to abandon the other for a period of
two years and then reward the faithless spouse a divorce for the wrong committed, in the face of a plea in bar based on such wrong." Id. at 90-91, 25
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

A limitation on this interpretation first appeared in Lockhart vLockhart.3 There the court stated that the effect of a judgment
granting a divorce from bed and board was to legalize the separation
of the parties which theretofore had been an abandonment on the
part of the husband. The court then concluded that the separation
contemplated by the statute included a judicial separation as well as
one brought about by an act of the parties. Therefore, the husband
could obtain a divorce two years after such separation.
This limitation was again applied in the recent case of Sears v.
Sears.4 In this case the husband sought an absolute divorce on the
ground of two years separation. The wife, who had been awarded
a divorce from bed and board by a New York court, set up as a.
defense the fact that the husband had originally abandoned her. In
rejecting this defense and granting the divorce, the court stated that
the husband's abandonment did not preclude him from maintaining
the action since it was brought more than two years after the divorce
from bed and board.
These cases raise the following question: why should a husband.
who seeks a divorce on the ground of two years separation be denied.
such divorce because he has abandoned his wife, and yet be able to,
obtain a divorce two years subsequent to the wife's judgment for
alimony without divorce or divorce from bed and board?
The rationale of the court in refusing to grant the abandoninghusband a divorce before the wife has brought an action for support
is that the husband should not be permitted to profit from his own,
wrong.' But where the wife has obtained a support decree or a
S.E.2d at 470. Whether the abandonment must be criminal or civil in order
to be a good defense, the court in Byers indicated that abandonment without failure to support was not a good defense to an action for absolutedivorce based on two years separation. See also Hyder v. Hyder, 215 N.C.

239, 1 S.E.2d 540 (1939). But in Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d
296 (1957), the court indicated that abandonment was a bar to the husband's
action for divorce although the husband continued to support the wife. For

a discussion of this problem, see Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 495 (1958).
223 N.C. 559, 25 S.E.2d 902 (1941).
'253 N.C. 415, 117 S.E.2d 7 (1960).
'Briggs v. Briggs, 215 N.C. 78, 1 S.E.2d 540 (1939); Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 208 N.C. 428, 181 S.E. 338 (1935). In the Sears case the court
referred to the wife's defense of abandonment as a plea of recrimination and
concluded that since the New York decree had legalized the separation of
the parties, she could not defend on the ground of recrimination. 253 N.C.
at 419, 117 S.E.2d at 10. But in Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d'
466 (1943), the court in holding that abandonment was a defense to an
action for divorce on the ground of two years separation, specifically statedthat this was not a matter of recrimination. The general rule is that the:
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divorce for bed and board, the court, in granting the divorce, says
that the prior decree legalized the separation of the parties.'
It appears that the court is seeking to balance two conflicting
social policies: (1) where the parties cannot live together in
harmony, it is in the best interest of society and the parties themselves to grant a divorce irrespective of who was the original wrongdoer ;7 (2) the wife should not become dependent on society but
should be able to obtain alimony.
In North Carolina alimony cannot be awarded in an action
for absolute divorce.' Therefore, the wife will not be able to obtain
support unless she has obtained an alimony decree prior to an award
of absolute divorce to the husband. In order to protect the wife, the
court uses the "wrongdoer" theory to deny the husband a divorce
even though he has complied with the literal provisions of the
statute. However, if the husband is granted a divorce on the ground
of two years separation after the wife has obtained a support decree,
such decree will survive the divorce.' Since the wife is protected in
the latter instance, the court grants the divorce and justifies its
decision by using the "legalized separation" theory.
In the majority of states which have statutes similar to the
North Carolina statute,"0 a divorce may be granted to either party
recriminatory grounds must be of equal standing with the plaintiff's grounds
for divorce. Evans v. Evans, 219 Ark. 325, 241 S.W.2d 713 (1951); Pharr

v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943).

Since two years separation

is a ground for an absolute divorce and abandonment is a ground only for a
divorce from bed and board, the two are not of equal standing. Thus
abandonment is not a recriminatory defense to an action for divorce on the
ground of two years separation. The court seems to be confusing the
doctrine of recrimination with the rule that an abandoning party will not be
allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
'Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 25 S.E.2d 902 (1941).
Where the statute provides for an absolute divorce based on separation
for a specified period, the courts are inclined to grant a divorce to either
party in the best interest of society irrespective of fault. E.g., Parks v.
Parks, 116 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Bernard v. Jefferson, 191 La. 881,
186 So. 599 (1939); Lemp v. Lemp, 62 Nev. 91, 141 P.2d 212 (1943).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1959); Yow v. Yow, 243 N.C. 79, 89

S.E.2d 867 (1955) ; Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946) ;

Duffy v. Duffy, 120 N.C. 346, 27 S.E. 28 (1897); accord, Commissioner v.
Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1959).
'0Eighteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have similar
statutes. They are listed in KE zER, MARRIAGE AND DivoRca § 455 (3d ed.
1946), as Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

1962]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

notwithstanding his or her fault." Also, in the majority of states,
alimony may be awarded in an action for absolute divorce.'" Therefore, the husband may obtain a divorce even though the wife has not
previously obtained an alimony decree.'"
Although the North Carolina court may be achieving desirable
results under its present policies, it is not the function of the court
to determine what the social policy should be in an area in which
the legislature has already made such determination. Since the
legislature has provided in express terms that a divorce shall be
granted after two years separation, the court should not qualify
this in order to carry out another policy-that of protecting the
wife's right to support from her husband rather than from society.
It is submitted that the legislature should amend our statutes to
permit an award of alimony in an action for absolute divorce. This
will permit the court to carry out both social policies and at the
same time adhere to the express mandate of the two years separation
statute.
BORDEN

R.

HALLOWES

Domestic Relations-Divorce and Adoption-Residence Requirement
for Servicemen
Acquisition by service personnel of a domicile of choice has for
many years presented vexing quandaries both to lawyers and to
legislatures. For example, questions as to domicile may be of
critical importance in resolving problems encountered by servicemen
in such diverse areas as taxation,' establishment of voting rights in
11

".g.,
Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P.2d 559 (1933); Sandlin
v. Sandlin, 289 Ky. 290, 158 S.W.2d 635 (1942) ; Best v. Best, 218 Ky. 648,
291 S.W. 1032 (1927) ; Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146 (1946) ;
Bernard v. Jefferson, 191 La. 881, 186 So. 599 (1939); Lemp v. Lemp, 62
Nev. 91, 141 P.2d 212 (1943).
" Northcutt v. Northcutt, 262 Ala. 98, 77 So. 2d 336 (1955) ; Schiebe v.
Schiebe, 57 Cal. App. 2d 336, 134 P.2d 835 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943) ; Weintraub
v. Weintraub, 302 N.Y. 104, 96 N.E.2d 724 (1951); Hyde v. McCoart, 82
R.I. 426, 110 A.2d 658 (1955).
"Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512 (1921) ; Rylands v.
Rylands, 65 Ariz. 97, 174 P.2d 741 (1946); George v. George, 56 Nev. 12,
41 P.2d 1059 (1935); Dawson v. Dawson, 62 Wyo. 519, 177 P.2d 200
(1947).
1 See Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937).
See
generally Baer, So Your Client Wants A Divorce, 24 N.C.L. Rrv. 1, 14
& n.55 (1945).

